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I. Introduction
This article will examine the effectiveness of present leg-
islation, both state and federal, as it pertains to the protection
of the welfare of animals used in agriculture. It will focus on
existing statutes, the applicable regulations which have been
promulgated under these statutes, and pertinent case law.
One of the underlying premises of this article is that our soci-
ety tolerates and even encourages the raising and slaughter of
animals for food products. Equally important is the under-
standing that farm animals raised for food production are sen-
tient and should be free from abuse and neglect in this pro-
cess. The issue this article attempts to address is whether the
welfare of those livestock animals is adequately protected
under existing law.'
During the past decade there has been a heated debate
* Richard F. McCarthy is a graduate of Harvard College and the Boston Univer-
sity School of Law. He has served as Editor-in-Chief of the Boston University Law
Review, Associate Editor of the Massachusetts Law Quarterly and as Managing Edi-
tor of the Massachusetts Law Review. He is a member of the Massachusetts Bar and
is engaged in the practice of law in Boston, Massachusetts.
** Richard E. Bennett is a graduate of Boston College and Boston College Law
School. He served as Annotation Editor for Willier and Hart's Uniform Commercial
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1. To some extent, there is a distinction between animal welfare and animal
rights. Welfare reflects people's concern with the well-being of animals; i.e. that peo-
ple should treat animals humanely and be required to do so. Animal rights goes fur-
ther. This concept advocates that animals have basic rights - to be free from torture,
abuse and perhaps even death. The scope or even the existence of "rights" in animals
goes beyond the scope of this article. The authors examine whether the existing legal
structure adequately protects animal welfare.
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over the treatment of livestock and poultry in commercial en-
terprises.2 Critics have focused their attention on what they
refer to as "factory farming".3 The term has little to do with
factories, however. It is intended to apply, in this article, to
any commercial enterprise in which a large number of live-
stock are raised in an intense environment other than the ani-
mals' natural habitat solely for the purpose of producing food.
Typically, this form of modern intensive production system
involves the raising of animals in an enclosed, confined build-
ing where feeding, watering and waste disposal are conducted
in an automated or semi-automated manner. The mere term
"factory farming" is anathema to its critics.4 The vast major-
ity of chickens, hogs, calves, and dairy cattle which are raised
for food products in the United States are raised in intensive
conditions.5 Critics of intensive production systems allege that
it is needlessly cruel and abusive to the animals in question
and it is morally repugnant.6 They charge that these systems
are characterized by overcrowding, restricted movement, un-
natural diets, painful branding and castration and cause stress
and severe suffering in farm animals.7 At bottom, the critics
believe that "factory farming" results in intensive confine-
ment in which animals are thought of only as economic units
without lives of their own.
2. Compare Comment, Factory Farming: An Imminent Clash Between Animal
Rights Activists and Argibusiness, 7 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 423 (1979) with S. Cur-
tis, Animal Welfare Concerns in Modern Pork Production, An Animal Scientist's
Analysis, (Nov. 4, 1980) (as presented to the Animal Welfare Comm'n of the U.S.
Animal Health Ass'n at Louisville, Kentucky on Nov. 4, 1980, available in printed
from the Nat'l Pork Producers Council, P.O. Box 10383, Des Moines, Ia. 50306).
3. Harrison, Animals in Factory Farms, in Animals and Their Legal Rights 69
(E. Leavitt 3d ed. 1978).
4. See Comment, supra note 2, at 425. The author details alleged cruelty suf-
fered by animals raised in confinement. Id. at 425-34.
5. Council for Agriculture Science and Technology, Report No. 91, Scientific As-
pects of the Welfare of Food Animals, 1-2 (Nov. 1981) [hereinafter cited as CAST
Report].
6. Note, The Rights of Non Human Animals and World Order: A Global As-
sessment, 28 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 377 (1983). A common thread running through criti-
cisms of intensive livestock production is the assumption that agricultural animals
have "rights", although the legal or philosophical basis of those rights is not clear.
7. See Comment, supra note 2, at 425-33.
[Vol. 3
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol3/iss2/4
STATUTORY PROTECTION
Advocates of intensive animal cultivation argue that it is
the most efficient manner in which to raise meat and related
food products.' Animals in this environment readily exceed
average egg production, milk production, and growth rates for
their kind. The confinement allows the producer to assure
that livestock are obtaining sufficient feed, water, and nutri-
ents plus proper treatment if sickness occurs.' It conserves
land and reduces the need for employees in the already de-
pleted manpower market in agriculture. The producers recog-
nize that the well-being of animals, which cannot be achieved
without careful attention to the welfare of animals, is an es-
sential element of economic profitability. They also focus their
attention on the "bottom line" analysis as well."0 They seek to
maximize profitability (as does any commercial enterprise) by
producing greater quantities and higher qualities of products
for the market at lower prices, which enhances the welfare of
the consumer. 1 They point out that housing, nutrition, and
disease control have progressed immensely over the past
twenty years as a result of intensive production. 2 The condi-
tions of animals in production operations involving many ani-
mals are, however, not the same as the conditions that lead to
the maximum welfare of the animals individually.' 3 Inevita-
bly, this leads to a conflict between human welfare and animal
welfare.
Supporters of the intensive animal production and live-
8. See Curtis, supra note 2, at 4-5.
9. G. Jackson, The Animal Rights Issue, Buckeye Farm News, July 1981, at 29.
Animal rights activists are particularly critical of the use of slotted floors in pork
production. However, pork producers defend this use as promoting a clean environ-
ment for the livestock thus reducing stress. Id.
10. Curtis, supra note 2, at 5.
11. One study of the commercial egg industry in the United States concluded
that it would cost the industry, and thus the consumer, $240,740,500 to convert from
4 to 3 hens per cage. King, Lasley, Holliman & Bray, A Discussion of the Economic
Significance to the Producer and the Consumer of Converting to Less Intensive
Commercial Egg Production in the United States (Aug. 1983) (submitted to Dr.
Terry B. Kinney, Jr., Adm'r, Agric. Resources Serv., U.S. Dep't of Agriculture, Rm.
302 Admin. Bldg., Washington D.C. 20250).
12. Gordon, Animal Welfare: An Issue to be Taken Seriously, 23 Feed & Feed-
ing Digest 3 (Nov. 24, 1981).
13. Id.
19861
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stock producers argue that three percent of the United States
population feeds the other ninety-seven percent of the popu-
lation, and the vast majority of consumers are generations re-
moved from their farm roots and do not understand the na-
ture of livestock production today."' As the prices of supplies,
feed, credit and related costs increase, producers have sought
to cut their costs of production to meet consumer demand.
Farm associations point out that consumers spend slightly
more than sixteen percent of their income on food.15 Of that,
about forty-five cents of each food dollar is spent on red meat,
poultry and dairy products.16 Advocates of agricultural inter-
ests argue that it is "factory farming" that has allowed the
farmer to meet this very clear consumer demand for reasona-
bly priced food of uniform quality and ample supply.17
The conflict between animal welfare and human welfare
has led to an emotionally charged debate, with critics charac-
terizing livestock producers as cruel, inhumane and insensitive
to the welfare of their animals.1 8 Typically, livestock produc-
ers are grouped together under the pejorative term "powerful
agribusiness corporations", without distinction between small
and medium-sized producers which may still be family
owned. 19 Producers see themselves under siege by uninformed
"suburbanites" whom they labor to feed. They resent "animal
welfarists" whose only exposure to animal life, they claim,
14. Id. at 1. The author distinguishes between "Animal Rights Advocates" whom
he suggests are vegetarians whose goal is to put an end to meat consumption and
"Animal Welfare Activitists" whom he suggests do not quarrel with the rights of
humans to eat meat, but are concerned that the rearing and slaughtering be humane.
15. Farm Animals, No One Has Greater Concern For the Care of Farm Animals
then the Farmer Who Raises Them, American Farm Bureau Federation Monograph
No. INF78159M (19_) (hereinafter cited as Monograph].
16. Id.
17. Id. Farm interests assert that it was consumer demand for meat protein that
led to the development of a new and more efficient network of livestock production.
"Barnyard animals" could not meet the demand.
18. For the broadest condemnation of the system, see generally Comment, supra
note 2. "Factory farming, characterized by overcrowding, restricted movement, un-
natural diets and unanesthetized surgical procedures . . . results in severe suffering
for the farm animal." Id. at 424 (citations omitted).
19. Id. at 424.
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might be the family pet.20 They suspect that the ulterior mo-
tive of the welfarist is to convert the United States into a na-
tion of vegetarians. The facts at issue become obscured.
Given the conflicting factual claims, 21 as well as conflict-
ing values,22 the question we, as lawyers, must ask is: where,
in the legal framework, do current "factory farming" practices
lie? Underlying this question is a more difficult question: at
what point do human values give way to animal values?13
The traditional legal process is well suited to addressing
these questions and formulating solutions. The law is not
static, and, as values change, the law is capable of adapting to
those changes.24 With respect to the conflicting factual claims
20. Cowie, A Call for Understanding, The Ohio Farmer, Sept. 19, 1981, at 33.
When a suburbanite whose experience with animals is limited to taking
his overweight pooch out for an evening stroll points an accusing finger, the
farmer is indignant. After all, the city dweller has washed his hands of rural
dirt and raising food....
Having chosen not to burden themselves with producing the food that
keeps them alive, they run them around and give the farmer instructions on
how to produce it. No wonder we resent animal welfarists. This is how we see
them.
Id. at 33.
21. Some believe that federal law provides greater protection to animals than to
humans. See Union County Jail Inmates v. Dibuono, 718 F.2d 1247 (3d Cir. 1983)
(Gibbons, J., dissenting). Judge Gibbons noted that the standards of confinement up-
held for pre-trial detainees "considering we are dealing with the treatment of human
beings, compare unfavorably with the standards mandated in federal law for the
treatment of animals." Id. at 1248.
22. Compare Note, supra note 6, at 389-90 ("The consumption of meat is, after
the uses of tobacco and alcohol 'the greatest single cause of mortality in the United
States.' Meat eating has been shown to be a contributing cause of Atheroscherosis
. ..cancer of the colon and breast, kidney disorders .... ") with Monograph, supra
note 15 ("[Tlhe nutrient value of animal products is indisputable. Complete pro-
tein-the kind with sufficient quantities of the eight amino acids-is found only in
animal products. The human body cannot manufacture these eight animal acids, so
they must be supplied through proper diet.").
23. For a very critical examination of the criteria that have been postulated to
support the concept of animal rights see Liddell, The Consistency from Marginal
Cases Argument for Animal Rights: A Critical Examination, 15 V.U.W.L. Rev. 147
(1985).
24. See State v. Kaneakue, 594 P.2d 590 (Haw. Ct. App. 1979) where the court
upheld a conviction for violation of a cruelty to animals statute wherein the charge
was cock fighting. The court held cock fighting to be "cruel" within the meaning of
the statute. Compare State v. Buford, 65 N.M. 51, 331 P.2d 1110 (1958) which inter-
preting a similar statute held that cock fighting did not constitute cruelty to animals.
5
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of harm to the animals, the traditional method of fact finding
through evidentiary hearings can sort out the truth. Both
sides claim to have studies supporting their positions. Testi-
mony before a fact finder could lay to rest those fallacious
claims based on emotion, rather than fact. This article will ex-
amine the legal development in this area to show how the law
has reacted to the issue of animal welfare in the past, and how
current law deals with farm animals.
II. Early Law
A. The Common Law
The common law treated animals essentially as chattels
or property of the owner.25 The law did not concern itself with
the welfare of the animals, and the owner'was free to treat the
animals as he wished in the absence of a statute or a public
display constituting a nuisance.26 As property, domestic ani-
mals were afforded some protection. A domestic animal could
not be abused by anyone not its owner, because this would
lessen the value of the property and make the abuser liable to
the owner for damages.2 However, the common law did not
perceive animals as having rights in themselves and therefore
did not protect animals from the infliction of unnecessary
pain.2 8 Undoubtedly, this attitude reflected the moral and
philosophical values of early Western tradition which recog-
nized human superiority and viewed animal life as necessary
to support human life.29 The prevailing Judeo-Christian ethic
In addition, it should be noted that Hawaii also had a statute which made it
illegal to manage or maintain a place for a cockfight while New Mexico did not have
such a statute.
25. See Comment, Toward Legal Rights for Animals, 4 Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 205,
209 (1975). The author reviews in detail the early legal concepts of animals in the
western world.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. State v. Bruner, 111 Ind. 98, 99, 12 N.E. 103, 104 (1887).
29. Early western philosophy rejected any kind of moral duty toward animals
because they had no capacity to reason. Aristole held that animals, like slaves, were
articles of property, and that animals existed for the sake of man. Aristotle, Animals
and Slavery, in Animals Rights and Human Obligations 109-10 (T. Regan & P.
Singer eds. 1976). See also, Comment, supra note 26, at 206-09.
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certainly reinforced the view that animals occupied a lower
station than did humans.30 There is some indication that this
view is giving way to changing values as there is now limited
judicial support for the concept that animals are more than
property.3 1
B. Early Statutes
The first anti-cruelty statute in what was to be the
United States was enacted by the Massachusetts Bay Colony
in the early seventeenth century.2 The statute proscribed cru-
elty toward animals kept for man's use. In the early nine-
teenth century, other states enacted statutes aimed at curbing
animal abuse, even by owners.3s These statutes departed from
the common law concept of animals as property and recog-
nized some degree of feeling in the animal.3 " The early anti-
cruelty statutes have been criticized because their rational un-
derpinning was a human interest, rather than an animal inter-
est; i.e., the legislation reflected the sentiment that cruelty to
animals was offensive to human morality and that we as a so-
ciety should not be subjected to those who would be cruel to
animals.385 The critics believe that when the underpinning of a
statute is a human interest, then in determining if there is a
violation, "almost any human interest will outweigh an animal
interest."3 In determining the validity of this criticism, one
must return to the seminal question of when do animal inter-
ests give way to human interests.
30. And God said let us make man in an image after our likeness-and let
them have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and
over the cattle, and over all the earth, and over any creeping thing that
creeps upon the earth.
Genesis 1:26 (King James)
31. Corso v. Crawford Dog and Cat Hosp., Inc., 97 Misc.2d 530, 531, 415
N.Y.S.2d 182, 183 (1979).
32. See Comment, supra note 26, at 212.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 213.
36. Id.
19861.
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III. Modern Legislation
A. Federal Legislation
Federal legislation addresses three areas of animal wel-
fare: (1) the transportation of animals; (2) the slaughtering of
animals; and (3) the welfare of animals used for experimental
purposes. In 1906, in response to public concern over the wel-
fare of livestock being transported great distances on rail cars,
Congress passed the Live Stock Transportation Act (LST),
designed to ensure that animals received water and were
rested during transport.3 7 The LST requires that animals can-
not be kept in transport for a period longer than twenty-eight
consecutive hours without unloading in a humane manner into
properly equipped pens for rest, water, and feeding.3 8 The
LST provides for fines in the event of violations reported by
the Secretary of Agriculture. 9 The LST has been criticized
because it was passed prior to the advent of motor transporta-
tion and, therefore, arguably does not apply to livestock trans-
ported in trucks.40 However, the language would seem to ap-
ply to any "common carrier, other than by water '41 so that
the argument could be made that motorized transportation
would be included within its purview.
The second area addressed by federal legislation is that of
the slaughtering of animals. In 1958, Congress passed the Hu-
mane Slaughter Act (HSA), which in its declaration of policy
states:
The Congress finds that the use of humane methods in
the slaughtering of livestock prevents needless suffering;
results in safer and better working conditions for the per-
sons engaged in the slaughtering industry; brings about
improvement of products and economies in slaughtering
37. Act of June 29, 1906, ch. 3594, 34 Stat. 607 (codified at 45 U.S.C. §§ 71-74
(1982)). This Act is known by a variety of common names such as the Live Stock
Transportation Act (LST), the Cruelty to Animals Act, the Twenty-Eight Hour Act
and the Food and Rest Law.
38. Id. § 71.
39. Id. §§ 73, 74.
40. See Comment, supra note 26, at 220.
41. 45 U.S.C. § 71 (1982).
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operations; and produces other benefits for producers,
processors and consumers which tend to expedite an or-
derly flow of livestock .... 4"
The HSA prescribes humane methods of slaughtering and
handling of livestock.43 In order to enforce the policy of the
HSA, it provides that the agencies of the federal government
shall not procure meat from slaughter houses which do not
comply with its provisions. 44 The effectiveness of the prohibi-
tion has been criticized because it is alleged that only the
large slaughter houses sell to the government, and they com-
prise eighty percent of those in business." The remaining
twenty percent are not affected. Whether these percentages
are valid today, after consolidation in the industry, is not
clear. 4 Some states have adopted Humane Slaughter Acts
which are modeled after the federal statute.47
By express terms, the HSA holds that slaughtering in ac-
cordance with the ritualistic requirements of the Jewish faith
is deemed to be humane as well." The Act provides that noth-
ing within it shall abridge in any way the rights or religious
freedom of any person or group.49 The constitutionality of the
exception for religious ritual slaughter has been upheld.50
42. Act of Aug. 27, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-765, 72 Stat. 862, as amended by Hu-
mane Methods of Slaughter Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-455, 92 Stat. 1009 (codified
in 7 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1906 (1982)).
43. 7 U.S.C.A. § 1902 (West 1973 & Supp. 1986).
44. 7 U.S.C. § 1903 (1982) (repealed) (effective date of repeal one year after Oc-
tober 10, 1978 but applicable for another 18 months for hardship cases).
45. Comment, supra note 26, at 221.
46. Id.
47. See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 24-601 to 24-615 (West 1983); Conn. Gen.
Stat. Ann. § 22-272a (West 1985); Fla. Stat. Ann. §§ 828.24-828.26 (West 1976 &
Supp. 1986); Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 8, §§ 229.51-229.58 (Smith-Hurd 1975 & Supp.
1986);Kan. Stat. Ann. §§ 47-1401 to 47-1405 (1981); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann.
§§ 287.551-287.582 (West 1979); Ohio Rev. Code. Ann. §§ 945.01- 945.99 (Page 1968
& Supp. 1985); Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 603.010-603.992 (1983); R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 4-17-1 to
4-17-7 (1976 & Supp.1986); Wash. Rev. Code §§ 16.50.100 to 16.50.900 (West Supp.
1986); W.Va. Code §§ 19-2E-1 to 19-2E-7 (1984).
48. 7 U.S.C.A. § 1902(b) (West 1973 & Supp. 1986).
49. 7 U.S.C. § 1906 (1982).
50. Jones v. Butz, 374 F. Supp. 1284 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) aff'd. mem., 419 U.S. 806
(1974).
1986]
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The third act passed by Congress is the Federal Animal
Welfare Act (AWA).51 The AWA is directed towards animals
used for research or experimental purposes, and it calls for
the registration of research facilities using animals52 and for
the licensing of dealers who supply animals.53 It does not in-
clude within its purview, however, animals raised for food
production.'
B. State Statutes
1. Overview
The balance of the protection afforded to livestock raised
for food production falls within state statutes. Every state has
an anti-cruelty statute in some form although they vary in de-
gree and comprehensiveness. Advocates of animal rights con-
demn these statutes as being inadequate in affording the pro-
tection that they believe is required for the animals. 55 The
balance of this article will examine the state statutes to deter-
mine their effectiveness in light of the charges made by those
espousing animal rights. The examination will concentrate on
the specific charges of cruelty leveled at commercial livestock
breeders to determine whether the breeders are susceptible to
determination, and where warranted, prosecution under state
statutes. As many of the charges are matters of factual dis-
51. The Animal Welfare Act (AWA) is administered by the United States De-
partment of Agriculture. The statute was first passed in 1966. Laboratory Animal
Welfare Act, Pub. L. No. 89-544, 80 Stat. 350 (1966). The Act was the amended in
1970, Animal Welfare Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-579, 84 Stat. 1560, and again in
1976, Animal Welfare Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-279, 90 Stat. 417.
Further amendments to the AWA were passed by the 99th Congress as part of the
Food Security Act of 1985 and became effective on December 24, 1986. Food Security
Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-198, 99 Stat. 1354 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§
2131-2157 (Supp. III 1985)).
52. Id. § 2136.
53. Id. § 2133.
54. Id. § 2132(g).
55. See Comment, supra note 26, at 226 ("The statutes still fail to define the
crucial term 'animal' and 'cruelty'. In short anti-cruelty statutes are still inade-
quate."); Note, supra note 2, at 437 ("However an analysis of this body of legislation
demonstrates that these [state] statutes provide virtually no real protection for the
modern farm animal.").
[Vol. 3
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pute, they are treated only as allegations and not as settled
facts.
Animal suffering can be divided into three categories:
abuse, neglect, and deprivation. Abuse consists of maltreat-
ment, i.e., beating, torture, overwork and what can only be de-
scribed as psychotic treatment of living beings. 6 Nearly every
state anti-cruelty statute prohibits this behavior. Neglect con-
sists of the failure to take those steps necessary to insure the
health of animals, i.e., denying confined animals adequate
food, water and air space. Once again, all or nearly all state
statutes specifically prohibit this form of neglect. Indeed, in-
sofar as livestock producers are concerned, this behavior is in
direct conflict with their own economic interests as it wastes
their investment. The more difficult category of suffering is
deprivation, which may be defined as denying an animal other
aspects of its environment less vital than food ,water and air,
but which to some degree affect its welfare.58 The most com-
mon forms of deprivation alleged by animal welfare advocates
are caging egg laying hens in excessively dense levels; the
practice of using artificial illumination during nightfall for
hens; trimming beaks; and confining gestating and farrowing
sows to stalls which causes undue stress.
It is in the area of deprivation that severe differences of
opinion lie between advocates of agricultural interests and
proponents of animal welfare. Practitioners of animal hus-
bandry argue that dense confinement of hens increases pro-
duction and reduces costs; that trimming beaks prevents can-
nibalism; and that confining farrowing hogs prevents the
piglets from being crushed by their mother. Most of the
state statutes, on their faces, do not address specific areas of
deprivation. However, all of them are suited to a determina-
tion on a case by case basis, by applying relevant community
standards and values as to what constitutes criminal depriva-
tion with respect to farm animals.
56. CAST Report, supra note 5, at 11. See also Curtis, supra note 2, at 5.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Cast Report, supra note 5, at 4-6.
19861
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2. Comprehensive Statutes
The most comprehensive state statutes affording animal
protection are those enacted by Minnesota 0 and North Da-
kota.6 1 The North Dakota Humane Treatment of Animal
Statute defines animals to include every living animal except
humans.6 2 The statute defines cruelty to include every "act,
omission or neglect whereby unnecessary or unjustifiable
pain, suffering or death shall be caused or permitted"63 (em-
phasis added). The statute requires that animals be provided
with the necessary food, water and shelter, and prohibits ani-
mals from being kept in any enclosure without exercise or
wholesome change of air. 4 Furthermore, there is a prohibition
against cruelty in the transportation of animals.6 6 This statute
applies to all animals, as defined, without exception. Violation
of the statute constitutes a misdemeanor 6 and enforcement of
the statute is vested in any sheriff, police officer, licensed vet-
erinarian or investigator employed by the State Livestock
Sanitary Board. 7
The Minnesota Prevention of Cruelty Act would appear
to meet many of the charges made against commercial live-
stock production. The Act proscribes every "act, omission or
neglect whereby unnecessary or unjustifiable pain, suffering or
death shall be caused or permitted" to animals.6 The statute
requires that animals that are kept in enclosures shall be pro-
vided with wholesome exercise, a change of air and the neces-
sary food, water or shelter.69 The Act specifically gives stand-
ing to any person who has reason to believe that an act of
cruelty has taken place and enables them to apply to a court
60. Minn. Stat. Ann. §8 343.20-343.36 (West 1972 & Supp. 1986) (renumbered in
the supplement).
61. N.D. Cent. Code §8 36-21.1.-01 to 36-21.1-12 (1980).
62. Id. § 36-21.1-01(1).
63. Id. § 36-21.1-01(3).
64. Id. § 36-21.1-02(2)-(3).
65. Id. § 36-21.1-03.
66. Id. § 36-21.1-11.
67. Id. § 36-21.1-06.
68. Minn. Stat. Ann. § 343.20 (West 1972 & Supp. 1986).
69. Id. §§ 343.21(2)-(4).
[Vol. 3
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of competent jurisdiction for a warrant and an investigation.7 0
If the court is satisfied that probable cause exists, it shall is-
sue a search warrant to a competent officer. The expense of
the investigation is borne by the party violating the statute.71
The Act provides that any animal being maintained in viola-
tion of its terms will be taken into custody by the officer exe-
cuting the warrant. Once again, the broad reach of the Minne-
sota statute, attained through both its definitions and the
power vested in private citizens, appears to afford protection
to livestock in production. Neither this statute nor the North
Dakota statute attempts to define every form of cruelty
possible.
As under any statute, questions remain: what constitutes
sufficient exercise, what constitutes sufficient change of air,
what is "unnecessary or unjustified" pain? But these are ques-
tions to which the legal process is suited to answer. As applied
to intensive livestock production, if a hog, poultry or veal pro-
ducer was challenged, he would have the opportunity of
presenting evidence as to the necessity of the treatment and
the welfare of the animal.72 Conversely, the prosecution would
produce its evidence of what constitutes cruelty, and a fact
finder, preferably a jury applying relevant community stan-
dards, would decide the facts. What the statutes permit is a
case by case examination of the definition applying contempo-
rary standards.7 3
3. Protective Statutes
A second category of statutes, while not addressing all of
the specific issues which have been raised with respect to con-
centrated husbandry methods, do provide a more specific
measure of protection than most of the other state statutes.
70. Id. § 343.22.
71. Id. § 343.23.
72. N.D. Cent. Code § 36-21.1-02 (1980).
73. Cf. State v. Klammer, 230 Minn. 272, 41 N.W.2d 450 (1950) (discussing the
evidence necessary to sustain a conviction of the owner of horses for depriving the
animals of the necessary food, water, and shelter).
1986]
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Connecticut, in its general anti-cruelty to animals statute,74
requires that impounded or confined animals be provided
with "proper care" and that they be supplied with "whole-
some air, food and water" as well as shelter. The specific re-
quirement of "wholesome air" is somewhat uncommon, 75 and
would appear to be directed at the more intensive husbandry
practices which call for the indoor confinement of animals.
However, the word "wholesome" is not defined and it is not
clear whether it is to be determined with reference to humans
or to animals.
The Connecticut statute should also be viewed in the
light of an additional statute76 which deals expressly with "in-
tensive poultry farming,"' 77 which is defined as poultry farm-
ing involving more than twenty thousand fowl. 78 The sole con-
cern of this statute is controlling the spread of diseases, both
in farming and in the importation of birds.79 This scheme,
which evolved between 1975 and 1984,80 includes provisions
for the seizure and destruction of diseased flocks 81 and helps
to protect the value of flocks to their owners. The absence of
any provisions regarding the treatment of the fowl themselves
can be viewed as an acceptance by the Connecticut legislature
of intensive poultry farming as an appropriate activity, so that
such methods do not per se violate the anti-cruelty to animals
statute. Instead, a case by case review of particular methods is
required.
Maine defines the word "animal" as "every living sentient
74. Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. §§ 53-247 to 53-253 (West 1985).
75. See Nev. Rev. Stat. § 574.120(1) (1985); N.Y. Agric. & Mkts. Law § 356
(McKinney Supp. 1986). These two states impose the requirement that "wholesome
air" must be provided for when animals are confined or impounded.
76. Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. §§ 22-322 to 22-326(c) (West 1985 & Supp. 1986).
77. Similar statutes exist in some other states with respect to feedlots, which
often have as their principal concern pollution control. See, e.g., Okla. Stat. Ann. tit.
2, §§ 9-201, -210 (West 1973 & Supp. 1987); Tenn. Code. Ann. § 44-18-103 (Supp.
1986).
78. Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 22-323a(a) (West 1985).
79. Id. § 22-322.
80. 1975 Conn. Acts ch. 232, 1981 Conn. Acts ch. 231, 1984 Conn. Acts ch. 2, 231,
260, 309.
81. Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 22-324 (West 1985 & Supp. 1986).
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creature." 2 It forbids an owner from depriving an animal of
"necessary sustenance, necessary medical attention, proper
shelter, protection from the weather or humanely clean condi-
tions.""3 A similar law in Massachusetts requires a "sanitary
environment. 8 4 These statutes have left it to courts and ju-
ries to develop what care is "necessary"8 5 or what constitutes
"humanely clean conditions" or a "sanitary environment." 86
Texas also extends certain additional protection to ani-
mals, not only requiring that they be provided with "neces-
sary food, care, or shelter"8' but also making it a crime when a
person "transports or confines an animal in a cruel manner. "88
Although the principal concern of the statute is cruelty in
transportation, it appears that it may also apply to concen-
trated husbandry methods, where animals are confined to
pens or cages. Again, the statute leaves the decision of
whether a particular practice is cruel or not to juries and
courts.89
4. Protective Statutes Excluding Farm Animals
A third category of statutes expressly excludes farm ani-
mals from provisions extending additional protection to ani-
mals generally. Some states, such as Vermont,90 have adopted
a state version of the federal Animal Welfare Act,91 which,
82. Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 17-A, § 510(2) (West 1983).
83. Id. § 510(1)(C).
84. Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 272, § 77 (West 1984).
85. See, e.g., State v. Tasker, 469 A.2d 1254 (Me. 1984) (defendant intentionally
or recklessly deprived two ponies of necessary medical attention); State v. Jordan,
126 Me. 115, 136 A. 483 (1927) (whether an owner was guilty of unnecessarily failing
to provide cows with proper food was a question for the jury).
86. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Curry, 150 Mass. 509, 23 N.E. 212 (1890) (dis-
cussing evidence required for failure to provide proper food, drink and protection).
87. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 42.11(a)(2) (Vernon Supp. 1986).
88. Id. § 42.11(a)(4).
89. See State v. McGuinnis, 541 S.W.2d 431 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976). The court
held that "[tihe jury should have been instructed on the definition of torture of an
animal and . . . permitted to determine whether the acts described in the circum-
stances of [a] case show the torture of an animal" under § 42.11 of the Texas Penal
Code. Id. at 432.
90. Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 20, §§ 3901-3912 (Supp. 1986).
91. 7 U.S.C. §§ 2131-2157 (Supp. III 1985).
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like the federal statute, excludes farm animals from its
coverage."'
Wisconsin provides an example of such a statutory
scheme. Its statute not only requires that animals be provided
with proper food and water,9" but also sets specific standards
for indoor and outdoor shelter, including ventilation, space,
temperature and sanitation standards.9" For indoor facilities,
the temperature must be "compatable with the health of the
animal" 95 and there must be adequate ventilation." Outdoor
facilities must provide shelter from sunlight and inclement
weather.9 7 Both types of facilities must allow the animal suffi-
cient space for "adequate freedom of movement" 8 and be
cleaned periodically "so as to minimize health hazards." 99 En-
forcement is by application to the local circuit for a search
warrant, to be issued upon a finding of probable cause. 100 Fur-
ther enforcement and prosecution appears to be left to the lo-
cal district attorney. 1
This statute plainly would provide many of the protec-
tions which the animal rights advocates claim should be pro-
vided for animals. However, the Wisconsin statute specifically
states that "[i]n the case of farm animals, nothing in this sec-
tion shall be construed as imposing shelter requirements or
standards more stringent than normally accepted husbandry
practices in the particular county where the animal or shelter
is located.' 0 2
A similar scheme exists in Washington, where a 1901 stat-
ute' 03 prohibits anyone with custody of an animal from "in-
92. Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 20, § 3901(4) (Supp. 1986); 7 U.S.C. § 2132(g) (Supp. III
1985).
93. Wis. Stat. Ann. § 948.13 (West 1982 & Supp. 1986).
94. Id. § 948.14.
95. Id. § 948.14(1)(a).
96. Id. § 948.14(1)(b).
97. Id. § 948.14(2).
98. Id. § 948.14(3)(b).
99. Id. § 948.14(4).
100. Id. § 948.16.
101. Id. § 948.18.
102. Id. § 948.14.
103. 1901 Wash. Laws ch. 146, § 4.
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flict[ing] unnecessary suffering or pain upon the same, or un-
necessarily fail[ing] to provide the same with proper food,
drink, air, light, space, shelter or protection from the
weather."'10 4 This statute applies to all animals, without
exception. 0 5
Violation of the Washington statute is a misdemeanor,
and prosecutions may be brought by any member of an incor-
porated humane society. 0 6 Such members, upon approval by
the trustees of the society and a judge, also may be empow-
ered to make arrests. 10 7
Washington's statute, as enacted in 1901, applied to all
animals without exception and effectively remained un-
changed until 1982. Then, while leaving those provisions in-
tact,' O8 the Washington legislature enacted an additional sec-
tion stating that "[niothing in this chapter applies to accepted
husbandry practices used in the commercial raising and
slaughtering of livestock or poultry, or products thereof or to
the use of animals in the normal and usual course of rodeo
events."1 9 The 1982 statute, creating an express exception to
a law which had remained unchanged for over eighty years,
indicates a consideration of this issue by the Washington leg-
islature and a policy decision that animals used in concen-
trated husbandry methods are not to have such protections
extended to them. Minimally, this recent amendment reflects
a policy that livestock animals are not accorded the same
scope of protection as domestic pets. "Why?," one may ask
rhetorically. The answer must lie in a judgment that human
values (food) prevail over animal values.
The Wisconsin and Washington statutes do not state
what husbandry practices are considered to be "normal" or
"accepted." This would appear to create an issue of fact to be
resolved at trial. Both the prosecution and defense at such a
trial may be required to present expert testimony and survey
104. Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 16.52.070 (West Supp. 1986).
105. Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 16.52.010 (West 1962).
106. Id. § 16.52.040.
107. Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 16.52.030 (West Supp. 1986).
108. 1982 Wash. Laws ch. 114.
109. Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 16.52.185 (West Supp. 1986).
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evidence of whether the husbandry methods in issue are "nor-
mal." Furthermore, in Wisconsin, if a particular method is
new to the particular county, it might not qualify for this ex-
ception, although generally accepted elsewhere."0
Similar statutory schemes exist in other states, although
they do not provide as much detail in connection with the re-
quirements for animals. Kansas requires that animals be pro-
vided with "food, potable water, protection from the elements,
opportunity for exercise and other care as is needed for the
health and well being of such kind of animal,""' but then ex-
cepts from this requirement "normal or accepted practices of
animal husbandry," among other activities. 1 2
Missouri requires that animals receive "adequate care,""'
which it defines as "normal and prudent attention to the
needs of an animal, including wholesome food, clean water,
shelter and health care. . . ." " However, "normal or accepted
practices of animal husbandry" are listed as an exception.'15
Pennsylvania requires that animals not be deprived of
"necessary sustenance, drink, shelter or veterinary care, or ac-
cess to clean and sanitary shelter," but states that this does
not apply "to activity undertaken in normal agricultural oper-
ation." 1 6 As in Wisconsin and Washington, the determination
of what is "normal agricultural operation"" 7 in Pennsylvania
and "normal or accepted practices of animal husbandry" in
Kansas" $8 and Missouri" 9 appears to be a question of fact for
determination by a jury or a court. Therefore, in a trial under
these statutes, local standards of "normal agricultural prac-
tice" would be at issue.
In contrast, Ohio requires that animals "other than cattle,
poultry or fowl, swine, sheep, or goats," which are kept in an
110. Wis. Stat. Ann. § 948.14 (West 1982 & Supp. 1986).
111. Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-4310(1)(C) (1980).
112. Id. § 21-4310(2).
113. Mo. Ann. Stat. §§ 578.005(1), .009(1), .012 (5) (Vernon Supp. 1986).
114. Id. § 578.005(1).
115. Id. § 578.007(8).
116. 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5511(c) (Purdon Supp.1986).
117. Id.
118. Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-4310(2)(f) (1980).
119. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 578.007(8) (Vernon Supp. 1986).
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enclosure, be permitted "wholesome exercise and change of
air. '" 2 Thus, under Ohio law, denial of exercise and air to the
listed animals does not violate the law, even if it is contrary to
all "accepted" or "normal" husbandry practices. A compari-
son of this statute to other such statutes shows that the
statutes of Kansas,'2  Missouri, 2  Pennsylvania,2 3 Washing-
ton'24 and Wisconsin,'2 do extend additional protection to
commercial animals, which are based on standards of human
activity. This is in contrast to states previously considered,
such as Minnesota, 12 6  North Dakota, 127  Connecticut, 12 8
Maine, 12 9 Massachusetts 130 and Texas,'' where the protec-
tions are based upon standards of animal activity.
Also of interest is a Maryland statute which makes it a
criminal offense for any person " having the custody of an
animal either as owner or otherwise" to inflict "suffering or
pain on the animal" or fail "to provide the animal with nutri-
tional food, veterinary care, proper air, space or shelter or pro-
tection from the weather.' 3 2 Like the Wisconsin and Wash-
ington statutes, this would appear to extend many of the
protections which are in dispute to all animals. Maryland is
also similar to Wisconsin and Washington in that it places re-
strictions on the application of its statute, so that
"[c]ustomary and normal veterinary and agricultural hus-
bandry practices including but not limited to dehorning, cas-
tration, docking tails and limit feeding are not covered by the
provisions of this section.' 1 33 Again, as with the Kansas, Mis-
120. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 959.13(A)(4) (Page Supp. 1985).
121. Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-4310(2)(f) (1980).
122. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 578.007(8) (Vernon Supp. 1986).
123. 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5511(d)-(h) (Purdon Supp. 1986).
124. Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 16.52.185 (West Supp. 1986).
125. Wis. Stat. Ann. § 948.14 (West 1982 & Supp. 1986).
126. Minn. Stat. Ann. § 343.21 (West 1972 & Supp. 1986).
127. N.D. Cent. Code § 36-21.1-02 (1980).
128. Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 53-247 (West 1985).
129. Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 17-A, § 510(1)(C) (West 1983).
130. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 272, § 77 (West 1984).
131. Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§ 42.11(a)(2) and (4) (Vernon Supp. 1986).
132. Md. Ann. Code art. 27, § 59(3) (Supp. 1986).
133. Id. § 59.
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souri, Pennsylvania, Washington and Wisconsin statutes,1 3 4
the determination of what is a "customary and normal" hus-
bandry practice appears to be a question of fact to be resolved
at trial.
The examples of exceptions listed in the Maryland stat-
ute support an argument that the exception applies only to
direct practices which physically alter or disfigure animals,
and that the statute was not intended to withdraw from com-
mercial animals the protections of proper air, space or shelter,
regardless of normal agricultural husbandry practices. This
argument receives support from the next sentence in the stat-
ute, which states that "[i]n the case of activities in which
physical pain may unavoidably be caused to animals ... cru-
elty shall mean a failure to employ the most humane method
reasonably available.' 13 5 It could be argued that any agricul-
tural husbandry method which is not the most humane
method available for the purpose of raising animals violates
this section.
5. General Protection Statutes
The fourth category of statutes are the most common.
These consist of states which have laws applicable to all ani-
mals, including farm animals, and which prohibit cruelty to
animals in general terms. 3 6 One of these is the New York
statute, which prohibits individuals from depriving animals of
necessary food or water or engaging in acts of cruelty towards
animals.137 This statute is applicable to all species, including
134. See supra notes 101-105.
135. Md. Ann. Code art. 27, § 59 (Supp. 1986).
136. Ala. Code § 13A-11-14 (1982); Alaska Stat. § 11.61.150(a) (1983); Ariz.
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-2910(a) (1978 & Supp. 1986); Ark. Stat. Ann. § 41-2918 (1985);
Cal. Penal Code § 597 (West Supp. 1986); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-18- 1 (1978 &
Supp. 1986); N.Y. Agric. & Mkts. Law § 353 (McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1986); N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 14-360 (1981 & Supp. 1985); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 21, § 1685 (West 1983
& Supp. 1985-1988); R.I. Gen. Laws § 4-1-2 (1976 & Supp. 1985); S.C. Code Ann.
§§ 47-1-40, -50 (Law. Co-op. 1977); S.D. Codified Laws Ann. § 40-1-2 (Law. Co-op.
1985); Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-3-104 (1982 & Supp. 1985; Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-301
(1978); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 13, § 403 (1984 & Supp. 1986); Va. Code § 29-213.91; W.Va.
Code § 61-8-19 (1984 & Supp. 1986); Wyo. Stat. § 6-3-203 (1977 & Supp. 1985-1986).
137. N.Y. Agric. & Mkts. Law § 353 (McKinney Supp. 1986).
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farm animals.138
Many states have an additional provision in their statutes
which require that animals be provided with proper shelter. 139
These statutes do not require that animals confined in shel-
ters be provided with fresh air, specific amounts of space, ex-
ercise or particular standards of cleanliness. The protections
extended in these statutes are to those animals which would
otherwise be left outside in harsh or inclement weather where
they might die from exposure.
These general protection statutes do not define what con-
stitutes cruelty to animals. This has been left to evolution in
the case law.'40 These statutes afford courts and juries the op-
portunity to reflect contemporary and evolving community
values regarding cruelty to animals. General protection stat-
utes do not have provisions which prevent the application of
the statutes to particular husbandry methods. If such laws are
not being so applied, one could view this as being a reflection
upon community values and standards; that is, the consensus
of the community and the courts is that such activities do not
constitute cruelty to animals.
6. General Protection Statutes With Farm Animal
Exceptions
The fifth category of statutes is closely related to the
fourth category. Like the others, they are general statutes,
prohibiting cruelty to animals. However, states in this cate-
gory have added express provisions in their laws which give an
exemption from the statutes to animals raised in husbandry.
138. Id. § 350(1).
139. E.g., N.J. Rev. Stat. § 4:22-17(c) (1973).
140. See People v. O'Rourke, 83 Misc.2d 175, 369 N.Y.S.2d 335 (1975) (causing a
limp horse to continue to work by pulling a hansom cab, the court found that this
constituted cruelty to the animal); New Jersey Soc'y for the Prevention of Cruelty to
Animals v. Bd. of Educ. of City of East Orange, 91 N.J. Super. 81, 219 A.2d 200
(1966), afl'd, 49 N.J. 15, 227 A.2d 506 (1967) (the court stated that cruelty to animals
as defined by the statute is an unjustifiable infliction of pain, thus the State Depart-
ment of Health could authorize scientific experimentation by high school students
which involved pain to animals as long as it was not unnecessary and aided in the
learning experience).
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For example, Indiana, after prohibiting such acts as animal
fights and the like, defines animal cruelty to animals as an act
where one "recklessly, knowingly or intentionally abandons or
neglects the animal."' 1" but expressly excludes "acceptable
farm management practices. '142 It should be noted that this
exception was added by a 1985 amendment, '43 thereby evi-
dencing the present intent of the Indiana legislature in this
matter. Again, what constitutes "acceptable farm manage-
ment practices" is an issue of fact for juries and the courts.
A similar statutory scheme exists in Illinois, which defines
the term "animal" to mean "every living creature, domestic or
wild, but does not include man. '14 Owners are required to
provide food, water, shelter, veterinary care and "humane care
and treatment."' 45 The issue of what is required as "humane
care and treatment" would be an issue of fact for juries and
the courts. However, the Illinois statutory scheme expressly
excludes from coverage "normal, good husbandry practices
utilized by any person in the production of food, companion
or work animals.' 4 As with Indiana, and other states such as
Kansas,'4 7 Missouri,148 Pennsylvania, 49 Washington'"0 and
Wisconsin,'5 ' this creates two threshold issues in any prosecu-
tion of concentrated husbandry methods. The first is estab-
lishing what are "normal, good husbandry practices." The sec-
ond is what is "humane care and treatment."
Also of interest is the Louisiana statute, as redrafted in
1982.152 This statute makes it a criminal offense for a person
to intentionally or with criminal negligence deprive an animal
of "proper food, proper drink, proper shelter or proper veteri-
141. Ind. Code Ann. § 35-46-3-2(b) (Burns Supp. 1986).
142. Id. § 35-46-3-2(f)(5).
143. 1985 Ind. Acts ch. 326.
144. Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 8, § 702.01 (Smith-Hurd 1975).
145. Id. § 703.
146. Id. § 713 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1986).
147. See supra notes 91-92 and accompanying text.
148. See supra notes 93-95 and accompanying text.
149. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
150. See supra notes 83-89 and accompanying text.
151. See supra notes 74-82 and accompanying text.
152. 1982 La. Acts ch. 432.
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nary care,"15 as those terms are defined in the statute.164 This
Louisiana law contains an exception only for "herding of do-
mestic animals" and not all animal husbandry practices. 155 It
is not clear what activities fall within the meaning of "herd-
ing". Finally, the statute also states that "[flor purposes of
this Section, fowl shall not be defined as animals."' 5 This ef-
fectively removes fowl, domestic and wild, from protection
under the cruelty to animals statute. This exception did not
exist in the prior version of the statute15 7 and no reason is
known for this unusual exception. The Louisiana statute, like
the Indiana law,' 58 shows that the current standards (as mani-
fested by legislative intent) are to reduce the legal protection
granted to animals, at least in particular circumstances.
Another recent statement of legislative policy was made
in Oregon which revised its law in 1985. 15 Under this new
statute, offenses were divided into animal abuse and animal
neglect, each in the first and second degree.8 0 However, "any
practice of good animal husbandry" does not violate the
animal abuse statutes.'6 ' As in other states, "good animal hus-
bandry" is defined in general terms as "accepted practices of
veterinary medicine or animal husbandry," and includes de-
horning, docking and neutering. 62 Husbandry operations still
must comply with the animal neglect sections, which require
that an animal be given "minimum care"'163 which is further
defined as "care sufficient to preserve the health and well-
being of an animal."' " This includes food, water and veteri-
nary care, 6 5 but the requirements for shelter, cleanliness,
153. La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14:102.1(A)(3) (West 1986) (citation omitted).
154. Id. § 14:102.
155. Id. § 14:102.1(C).
156. Id. § 14:102.1(D).
157. Id. § 14:102.1.
158. See supra notes 120-22 and accompanying text.
159. 1985 Or. Laws ch. 662.
160. Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 167.315-16.330 (1985).
161. Id. §§ 167.315(2), 167.320(2).
162. Id. § 167.310(1)(b).
163. Id. §2 167.325(1), 167.330(1)(a).
164. Id. § 167.310(2).
165. Id. § 167.310(2)(a),(b), (d).
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temperature and exercise space are restricted to "pet or do-
mestic animals"'6 which are defined as "other than livestock
or poultry. '167 Therefore, the Oregon legislature has expressly
declined to extend these additional protections to animals
used for commercial purposes. However, what constitutes the
"well-being of an animal" is an issue which remains to be de-
termined by juries and courts on a case by case basis. Finally,
the statutes add an express exemption from both the animal
abuse and the animal neglect laws for "commercially grown
poultry" absent "gross neglect." 6" This would appear to re-
move, in effect, all protections of fowl used in concentrated
operations, regardless of whether the practices used are "ac-
cepted" or not, or whether they are abusive or neglectful.
The Oregon statute, like the Louisana, Indiana and Illi-
nois statutes, reflect recent consideration of the issue of
animal welfare by state legislatures. In each case, the state
legislature has chosen to adopt statutes which expressly ex-
cluded farm and/or commercial animals from coverage. These
statutes apply equally to concentrated husbandry methods as
well as to other husbandry methods. This evidences a consen-
sus that additional protections have not been extended to
food animals.
7. Other Pertinent Statutory Provisions
A number of states have considered whether the slaugh-
ter of animals for use as food may constitute cruelty to ani-
mals, even when in apparent conformity with the Federal Hu-
mane Slaughter of Livestock Act'69 and the related federal
regulations1 70 governing such slaughtering. States such as Del-
aware, 17 1 Georgia' 72 Kentucky,7M Nevada,17 4 Washington, 175
166. Id. § 167.310(2)(c), (e).
167. Id. § 167.310(1)(d).
168. Id. § 167.335.
169. 7 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1906 (1982).
170. 9 C.F.R. §§ 313.1-313.90 (1986).
171. Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 1325 (1979 & Supp. 1986).
172. Ga. Code Ann. § 16-12-4 (1984).
173. Ky. Rev. Stat. § 525.130(2)(b) (1985).
174. Nev. Rev. Stat. § 574.200(3) (1985).
175. Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 16.52.180 (West 1962).
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and Wisconsin 1 0 have specific statutory exemptions removing
the killing of food animals from their general anti-cruelty
laws.
Finally, statutes of other states raise different points of
varying interest. Although Alabama outlaws cruelty to ani-
mals in general terms,' 77 it requires public school students to
receive at least twenty minutes of instruction weekly in "kind-
ness, justice and humane protection of birds and animals and
the important place they occupy in the economy of nature. '" 1 78
Some states have laws prohibiting the vivisection of animals
in schools and otherwise regulating the use of animals in
schools. 79 New Mexico prohibits the separation of the off-
spring of livestock from the mother except for dairy cows.18 0
Oklahoma requires that "a bailee of living animals must pro-
vide then with suitable food and shelter, and treat them
kindly."' 8 ' What this means is unclear. Texas 182 and Connect-
icut 83 place particular restrictions on cages for fowls, but
these do not appear to be inconsistent with concentrated pro-
duction methods. West Virginia prohibits the killing of calves
less than four weeks old.""4
V. Conclusion
As long as debate continues regarding what constitutes
proper care in the raising of livestock and poultry, there can
be no unanimity of opinion that can successfully be embodied
in a legal code. It is not accurate, however, to say that our
legal framework does not provide protection to animals raised
in intensive livestock and poultry facilities. The open question
is what degree of protection is needed. Certainly, the compre-
176. Wis. Stat. Ann. § 948.015 (West 1982 & Supp. 1986).
177. Ala. Code § 13A-11-14 (1982).
178. Ala. Code § 16-40-4 (1977).
179. N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 644.8(c) (1986).
180. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-18-5(D) (1984).
181. Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, § 454 (West 1966).
182. Tex. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 181 (Vernon 1969) (emphasis added).
183. Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 53-249 (West 1985).
184. W. Va. Code § 16-7-6 (1985).
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hensive statutes of North Dakota and Minnesota provide a
general guarantee of the animal's welfare. To a lesser extent,
the protective statutes of Connecticut, Texas and Maine also
provide a framework in which one could seek to test the wel-
fare of animals. Even those statutes which exclude "normally
accepted husbandry" practices proscribe treatment that devi-
ates from what would be considered "acceptable" practices.
As a consensus emerges, these questions will be resolved.
If anything is demonstrated by the present statutory
schemes, it is that specific complaints of animal rights advo-
cates have not been addressed by the legislatures. Indeed, if
one looks at the recent amendments in Wisconsin and else-
where, one can infer a recent legislative intent to reject the
application of animal right theories to farm animals. However,
nearly all of the statutes are sufficiently broad to proscribe
treatment of farm animals which, by consensus, is deemed
cruel.
Nature shows that not all species accept the inviolability
of animal life. Species in their natural habitats are predatory
and carnivorous. Therefore, the natural order of existence ap-
pears to accept and contemplate such behavior. Man is such a
species.
Some current philosophers assert that the universe de-
rives from a single source and that all matter has some degree
of sentience and consciousness, and that the difference be-
tween one species or order and another is merely one of de-
gree.18 Under this view, if species other than man are to be
considered to have inherent rights, then the issue becomes
how to set a limit on the species and orders possessing such
rights. If there are no limits, then all plant life, and other ma-
jor sources of sustenance for man and animal life, have rights.
Mainly, if man and animals are to continue to exist, then
plants may not have an inherent right to protected existence.
As we have seen from the current debate over animal wel-
fare, we, as a society, have not come to an agreement on either
the existence or the extent of animal rights. The majority
185. See T. Regan & P. Singer, Animal Rights and Human Obligations 148-62
(1976).
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view, however, as reflected in statutes and case law, appears to
ascribe few, if any, such rights.
27
